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Book Review

Sanctity of Contracts in a Secular Age:
Equity, Fairness and Enrichment by
Stephen Waddams1
A. CHRISTIAN AIRHART2
WHAT CONDITIONS MUST BE met before the law will enforce a promise? If one

asks lawyers and students from across the common law world, they will answer:
an offer, an acceptance of the offer, and a mutual exchange of value. Of course,
they will add, it is not as simple as that; such a formulation on its own can
produce highly unfair results, and experience and the passage of time have
birthed a myriad of exceptions to the rule. It is those exceptions that are the focus
of Sanctity of Contracts in a Secular Age: Equity, Fairness and Enrichment. Written
by Stephen Waddams, Professor and Goodman-Schipper Chair at the University
of Toronto Faculty of Law, the book traces the historical contingencies and
normative considerations that led to the creation and development of exceptions
to contract enforceability, and challenges the notion that those exceptions should
be set in stone.
Waddams’ book questions whether contract law’s enduring fidelity to the
idea of “sanctity of contract,” even at the cost of unfair consequences, is justifiable
in modern times. The term harkens back to the early moral conception of a
contract as a promise binding on one’s conscience, in an ecclesiastical sense.3 One
1.
2.
3.

Stephen Waddams, Sanctity of Contracts in a Secular Age: Equity, Fairness and Enrichment
(Cambridge University Press, 2019) [Sanctity of Contracts].
JD Candidate (2021), Osgoode Hall Law School.
See generally Sir David Hughes Parry, The Sanctity of Contracts in English Law (Stephens &
Sons Limited, 1959).
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notable commentator remarked that “although ‘sin,’ on the one hand, and ‘crime’
and ‘breach of contract’ on the other are to us today quite distinct conceptions,
this was not always so.”4 In contrast, sanctity of contract in contemporary secular
society lacks salience as a meaningful moral basis for contract enforcement,
so other explanations have arisen to take its place.5 Human will, reliance,
efficiency, fairness, bargain theory, and consent have all been advanced as
theories that can supply normative rationales for enforcing contracts.6 However,
Waddams bases his approach in the “fairness” theory, which maintains that the
substance of an agreement should be examined—irrespective of the process by
which the agreement was reached.7 If the agreement is sufficiently unfair, courts
should refuse to enforce it. Rather than using fairness merely as a way to explain
current exceptions to contract enforceability, Waddams instead advocates for
recognition of a general power of courts—grounded in equitable principles—to
refuse to enforce contracts “where the consequences of enforcement would be
highly unreasonable.”8
The book is divided into thirteen chapters. Thematically, it is divided in
two: Waddams devotes the first eight chapters to recapitulating the disparate
law of exceptions to strict enforcement of contracts; he then moves on to discuss
the role and jurisdiction of the judiciary and locates support for a reinvigorated
approach to equity jurisprudence. The book begins by situating exceptions to
enforceability in their historical context, as products of the common law, equity,
and principles of interpretation and evidence, developed in reaction to highly
unreasonable contracts and permitting their modification. Waddams then
canvasses the principal doctrines of exception derived from equity, the common
law concept of duress, and judicial techniques of interpretation that have been
used to avoid highly unreasonable consequences in contractual disputes. The
book then examines the role of reasonableness in other contexts. Waddams uses
existing methods of calculating damages for breach of contract to demonstrate
that courts do not treat even valid and enforceable contracts as absolute or
sanctified—courts place limits on them to avoid unreasonable consequences.
Next, he draws attention to the role of documentary evidence and the urgency
of avoiding enforcement of highly unfair agreements in an age where electronic
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ibid at 6.
Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 1-7.
For a discussion of these theories and their respective strengths and weaknesses, see Randy
Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract” (1986) 86 Colum L Rev 269 at 271-91.
See e.g. Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 202-203, 218-20. See also SM Waddams,
“Unconscionable Contracts: Competing Perspectives” (1999) 63 Sask L Rev 1 at 3-4.
Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 233.
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contracts can be formed with the click of a button. Waddams concludes his
review of the law with an analysis of the doctrines of unconscionability and unjust
enrichment. Up to this point, the book is a brief but thorough review of the
many sorts of situations where courts will refuse to order the strict enforcement
of agreements, and the rationales they have used for doing so.
The final five chapters set out the larger legal and historical contexts underlying
the development of exceptions to strict enforcement of contracts. This part begins
with an assessment of the impact of the Judicature Act of 1873,9 which merged
the courts of common law and equity into a single jurisdiction that persists today.
The judicial role is then explored: Waddams advocates for an active judicial role
in contract law development, addressing and rebutting arguments that unfairness
in contract enforcement should be a matter solely left to legislative reform, and
justifying his position in light of the function and scope of judicial discretion.
Waddams then discusses public policy limitations of sanctity of contract when
it trenches upon the public interest. He concludes that the foregoing militate in
favour of a general power of the courts to offer relief where enforcing contractual
obligations would lead to highly unreasonable results.
In this comprehensive review, Waddams is particularly concerned with the
instances where doctrines of exception have failed, producing absurd or unfair
consequences. These failures manifest in marginal cases involving contractual
obligations that provoke a strong feeling of injustice and unfairness, but which
are enforced because they do not quite fit within existing exceptions. Waddams
uses these marginal cases to demonstrate the inherent difficulty, perhaps even
impossibility, in creating principled exceptions that rely on precise legal tests with
unyielding boundaries. Any attempt to draw a bright line in these liminal areas
shifts the margin and creates different problems. Thus, it is argued that a general
power to grant relief in highly unfair situations is preferable.
Waddams illustrates the consequences of a strict, technical, and rule-based10
approach to enforcement using Arnold v. Britton,11 a recent decision of the U.K.
Supreme Court. It involved tenants who signed leases of land in the 1970s,
during a period of high inflation. The leases required the lessees to pay £90 per
year (ostensibly for a “proportionate part of expenses” for repairs and services)
and that amount was to increase by “Ten Pounds per Hundred” every three
years.12 This compounded the initial £90 to ten times that amount by 2012,
9.
10.
11.
12.

Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict, c 66.
Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 220.
2015 UKSC 36 [Arnold v Britton].
Ibid at paras 5-6.
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and would exceed one million pounds annually by the time the ninety-nine year
leases ended.13 The Court upheld the leases, leading to a result that a dissenting
judge described as “grotesque” and “commercial nonsense.”14 Waddams draws
attention to the almost apologetic posture of the majority, who “recognized the
unreasonable and unfair nature of the result, but held that the court was powerless
to prevent it.”15 Addressing and rebutting the notion that courts are powerless to
prevent highly unfair outcomes is the project of this book.
The book adds to a large body of scholarship that has engaged in fraught
attempts to locate a unifying moral justification for enforcing or declining to enforce
promises. Lord Denning famously attempted a synthesis of unconscionability,
undue influence, duress, and the law governing salvage agreements in Lloyds Bank
v. Bundy,16 finding a common element of “inequality of bargaining power.”17
Other theories find moral justification in the promisor’s voluntarily willed
choice to be bound by his or her promise18 or in the promisee’s reliance on that
promise.19 In an article published in 1976,20 Waddams himself argued in favour
of recognizing a “general principle of unconscionability”21 to unite exceptions—
adding to Lord Denning’s categories forfeitures,22 penalties,23 deposits,24 and
exemption clauses25 which “address agreements that are unfair, inequitable,
unreasonable, or oppressive.”26 Each theory has strengths and weaknesses,27 but
none has succeeded in creating a moral justification that convincingly explains
the result in every case. More recent commentary has suggested that doing so
may be impossible. In 1998, Robert Summers and Robert Hillman of Cornell
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 54-55.
Arnold v Britton, supra note 11 at paras 138, 158.
Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 55.
Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy, [1974] 3 All ER 757.
Ibid at 765.
See e.g. Roscoe Pound, “The Role of Will in Law” (1954) 68 Harv L Rev 1; Morris R Cohen,
“The Basis of Contract” (1933) 46 Harv L Rev 553.
See e.g. PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, 1979);
LL Fuller & William R Perdue, “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I”
(1936) 46 Yale LJ 52.
SM Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts” (1976) 39 Mod L Rev 369
[Unconscionability in Contracts].
Ibid at 391.
Ibid at 370.
Ibid at 373.
Ibid at 375.
Ibid at 378.
Ibid at 390.
Barnett, supra note 6.
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wrote that “no one has yet formulated a satisfactory ‘unified field theory of civil
obligation’ and we doubt that anyone ever will or could.”28
Rather than advancing a unifying theory to explain the law, Waddams
pursues a more radical course in seeking to address its inadequacies. Developing
on the arguments in his 1976 article, Waddams dispenses with the terminology
of “unconscionability” as a proxy for unfairness—the expression is implicitly
tied to earlier notions of sanctity of contract and its invocation of conscience.
He prefers the clarity afforded by characterizing morally-suspect contracts as
“highly unreasonable.”29 This distinction is largely semantic, but nonetheless
significant. Rather than expand the existing legal concept of unconscionability
as an explanation for a series of exceptions, Waddams posits instead that the
exceptions are expressions of an underlying equitable principle of avoiding highly
unreasonable consequences and it is an error to treat them as a closed category.30
He argues that the root cause of this error is a judicial sensibility that took hold
after the English Judicature Acts:
The courts of equity had wide powers to modify contracts in order to avoid highly
unreasonable consequences. After 1875 a single court administered both law and
equity, and statute provided that where ‘there is any conflict or variance between
the Rules of Equity and the Rules of the Common Law with reference to the same
matter, the Rules of Equity shall prevail’. But this apparent victory for equity proved
illusory. In 1875, the individualistic spirit of the time, combined with a belief
that law, especially contract law, should be clear, certain and predictable, led to
a tendency to marginalise the instances in which contracts could be modified for
reasons of fairness or mistake. Contractual rights were perceived as primary, and
as absolute, subject to established intrusions by equity…modification of contracts
was only warranted where the case fell clearly into a distinct category where equity
would have intervened before 1875.31

A principled overarching explanation for existing exceptions which treats
them as exhaustive—effectively functioning as a limiting principle—is neither
desirable nor possible, because it would imply that they represent the extent of
relief that the law should allow. Expanding the law using substantive fairness as
a principle avoids theoretical difficulties faced by attempts to use fairness as an

28. Robert A Hillman & Robert S Summers, “Casebook Review: The Best Law School Subject”
(1998) 21 Seattle UL Rev 735 at 737.
29. Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 233.
30. Ibid at 158-159.
31. Ibid at 158.
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explanation for existing exceptions.32 For instance, it is difficult to explain the
law’s historical refusal to enforce penalty clauses as a matter of fairness when it
enforces functionally identical clauses so long as they are described as “deposits.”33
Waddams avoids such artificiality, instead viewing these sorts of exceptions as
products of historical contingencies that should be modified accordingly if they
produce unfair or anomalous results.34
Waddams’ focus on highly unfair and unreasonable agreements is also
important. The most prominent critique of substantive unfairness as a basis for
contract enforcement is the inherent difficulty in objectively evaluating what is
“fair.”35 There is no obvious principled way to draw a bright line between fair
and unfair agreements—it is inevitably a discretionary exercise. Waddams seem
to recognize this objection as the principal obstacle to adoption of his approach,
and he devotes chapters nine through eleven to arguing that, not only do judges
have a residual equitable jurisdiction to relieve against highly unfair obligations,36
but this discretion can be exercised in a legitimate37 and principled way that does
not undermine the goal of minimizing uncertainty.38 Establishing tests based on
subjective and normative criteria is notoriously difficult, but is hardly without
precedent. Justice Potter Stewart famously said of the threshold test for obscenity,
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it….”39 This sort of general
power to refuse to enforce highly unfair agreements that fall into the interstitial
spaces between existing exceptions, in spite of its apparent ambiguity, may be the
only way to “fill the gaps between the existing islands of intervention.”40
32. See e.g. Marcus Moore, “Why Does Lord Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still?
The Prospects of Finding a Unifying Principle for Duress, Undue Influence and
Unconscionability” (2018) 134 Law Q Rev 257 at 267-69. Moore critiques Waddams’ earlier
theory in Unconscionability in Contracts as failing to distinguish between special exceptions
and general rules.
33. For this argument, see Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 18-19, citing Bridge v Campbell
Discount Co Ltd, [1962] AC 600 (HL) at 629. See also Hamish Lal, “The doctrine of
penalties and the ‘absurd paradox’ - does it really matter in 2003?” (2003) Int Construction L
Rev 505. Cf Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi, [2015] UKSC 67.
34. Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 16-19.
35. See Barnett, supra note 6 at 284.
36. Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 158-72.
37. Ibid at 173-81.
38. Ibid at 183-86, 199-200.
39. Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184 at 197 (1964) [emphasis added].
40. SM Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed (Canada Law Book Inc, 2010) at para 544.
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Sanctity of Contracts in a Secular Age is both an argument and a didactic
tool. It systematically and comprehensively lays out the history of exceptions to
contract enforcement, drawing particular attention to the role of equity, which
Waddams fears is fading from the consciousness of law students and judges alike.41
The book succeeds in demonstrating the arbitrariness, sometimes bordering on
incoherence, that characterizes many existing doctrines of contract enforcement,
as well as the absurd and unfair consequences that can ensue when they are
treated as sacrosanct. It puts forth a solution to the problem, contextualised by its
implications for the judicial role, economic and social policy, and the historical
development of the common law. It is an excellent supplement for both law
students and practitioners, and a serious moral argument about the current state
of contract law and the purposes it should serve in the twenty-first century.

41. Sanctity of Contracts, supra note 1 at 159.

